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Contrary to the recent literature that concludes that the GATT/WTO has been completely ineffective
in promoting world trade, this paper furnishes robust evidence that the institution has had a powerful
and positive impact on trade. The impact has, however, been uneven. GATT/WTO membership for
industrial countries has been associated with a large increase in imports estimated at about 44
percent of world trade. The same has not been true for developing country members, although those
that joined after the Uruguay Round have benefited from increased imports. Similarly, there has



















I.   INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), were set up to promote world trade. That trade increased courtesy of 
this institution may seem self-evident. To the doubters, Bhagwati (1991) has this succinct 
riposte: 
 
“A common criticism is that the GATT in truth is the General Agreement to Talk and Talk: It 
has delivered nothing. This is nonsense.” (p. 5.) 
 
However, in one of the first and very few empirical analyses of this question, Rose (2002a 
and 2002b), after an impressively meticulous and comprehensive scrutiny, has argued that 
there is no evidence that the WTO has increased world trade. To quote Rose (2002a): 
 
“My quantitative examination indicates that there is little reason to believe that the 
GATT/WTO has had a dramatic effect on trade.  In particular, once standard gravity effects 
have been taken into account, bilateral trade cannot be strongly and dependably linked to 
membership in the WTO or its predecessor the GATT.” (p. 23.) 
 
In this paper, we attempt to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the well-entrenched 
belief in the benefits of the WTO and the conclusion of Rose’s analysis. We will furnish 
evidence that Rose’s analysis is incomplete and can be misread seriously. The 
incompleteness is on two grounds. 
 
On econometric grounds, Rose’s analysis needs to be refined methodologically in one 
important respect to incorporate the results of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), who show 
that a gravity equation grounded in theory always needs to include country fixed effects. On 
economic grounds, it needs to be further elaborated to take account of the asymmetric 
manner in which the WTO has effected trade liberalization in the post-war period. Once 
these are done, we find robust evidence that the WTO (and its predecessor, the GATT) has 
promoted world trade. We estimate that the WTO may have increased world imports by 
about 44 percent or about US$3 trillion in 2000 alone. 
 
Interestingly, our results on the WTO’s trade impact are exactly in line with what they should 
be, given the liberalization asymmetries. We emphasize three types of asymmetries: between 
developed and developing countries; between developing countries that joined the WTO 
before and after the Uruguay Round; and between sectors where the WTO has been effective 
in bringing down trade barriers and those—notably agriculture, and textiles and clothing—
where it has been less effective. Rose (2002a and 2002b) notes these asymmetries but does 
not pursue them empirically. Instead he focuses on the average behavior of WTO members, 
which could obscure the great unevenness in the patterns of trade liberalization across 
members, across time, and across products. The verdict on the ineffectiveness of the WTO is 
overturned once one refines the econometric specification and takes account of these 
asymmetries. 
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A.   First Asymmetry: Developed Versus Developing Countries 
It is well-recognized that the WTO, and more especially its predecessor the GATT, has been 
a two-tier organization, with far greater liberalization obligations imposed on its developed 
than its developing country members. As Table 1 shows, developed countries, under 
successive rounds of trade negotiations, have successfully reduced their tariff  barriers. These 
numbers suggest that industrial countries, under the aegis of the GATT, reduced their 
average tariffs from over 15 percent in 1947 to about 4.5 percent today. 
 
This, combined with the fact that the rules have required that developed countries not impose 
nontariff barriers (especially quantitative restrictions), has meant that the WTO should have 
been a motor of overall trade liberalization by industrial countries. Of course, during the 
post-war era industrial countries did seek recourse to nontariff barriers, in violation of the 
spirit if not the letter of WTO rules. They included voluntary export restraints (in cars and 
steel), explicit quantitative restrictions (agriculture and clothing), and antidumping. Although 
many of these barriers were sectoral in nature, their imposition could have offset the effects 
of the tariff liberalization. Whether they did so is an empirical question that we allow the data 
to settle. 
 
In contrast, and since the early days of the GATT, developing countries have had far fewer 
obligations to liberalize. This reluctance of developing countries to take on obligations to 
liberalize under the WTO was codified under the principle of special and differential 
treatment (S&D), which has defined the terms of developing country participation or rather 
virtual non-participation. In terms of developing countries’ own liberalization, S&D 
consisted of two elements.
1 
 
First, developing countries have not, until the Uruguay Round, really participated in tariff 
liberalization in the various rounds. This is reflected in Table 2 which illustrates that until the 
Uruguay Round developing countries had “bound” less than a third of their tariff lines 
compared to nearly 85 percent for industrial countries.
2 That is, developing countries had no 
commitments as regards their tariffs for over two-thirds of their imports. And even on the 
30 percent of the bound lines, the commitments to liberalize were weak because the bound 
rate was well above the applied, the prenegotiation rate, typically by over 10 to 15 percentage 
points. 
 
                                                 
1 S&D also had another pillar, the grant of preferential market access by developed countries 
to their developing country trading partners, which led to the institution of GSP and similar 
schemes (see Wolf, 1986, for an excellent analysis of the rationale and consequences of 
S&D). 
2 When a country “binds” its tariffs in the GATT/WTO (or undertakes tariff “bindings”), it 
commits not to raise its tariffs above the level at which the tariff is “bound.” Note that these 
numbers relate to the late 1980s; for much of the post-war period, the proportion of bindings 
was even smaller.  5
Second, the permissiveness of the GATT toward developing countries extended not just to 
tariff liberalization but also the basic rules on nontariff barriers, particularly their use of 
quantitative restrictions for balance of payments reasons that was sanctioned under Article 
XVIII:B of the GATT.
3 
 
Indeed, a number of the large developing countries invoked the right to use quantitative 
restrictions on their imports for the major part of the post-war period; in some instances this 
right extended to over five decades. This is illustrated in Table 3. In practice, the right to use 
quantitative restrictions generally coincided with their actual use. This use of quantitative 
restrictions was a crucial aspect of special and differential treatment. 
 
B.   Second Asymmetry: New Versus Old Developing Country Members 
The second, temporal asymmetry, in the WTO derives from the above. As the Uruguay 
Round progressed, it became clear that one of its objectives was to narrow the gap between 
developed and developing countries in terms of their respective obligations to liberalize trade 
barriers. This objective was particularly important in defining the terms of accession of new 
WTO members, namely those that joined after the Uruguay Round negotiations had 
commenced. The Chinese accession in 2001 is a case in point. The accession came at the end 
of a 13-year process in which the list of liberalization obligations imposed on China grew 
steadily. China was given a shorter phase-in period to complete the liberalization obligations 
than earlier developing country members. At the end of the phase-in period, China’s trade 
regime will be more open than most of the existing developing country members of the WTO 
today. The Chinese case has its special features, but the more demanding nature of 
liberalization obligations could have applied to other new WTO members as well. 
 
C.   Third Asymmetry: Protected Versus Liberalized Sectors in Developed Countries 
Third, there has been asymmetry in the liberalization between different sectors. While 
developed countries brought down their trade barriers, they exempted a number of key 
sectors—agriculture, textiles and clothing—from their liberalization efforts. In fact, this 
exemption was reflected not just in the fact that tariffs remained high in these sectors. The 
rules on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions were themselves bent to allow their use in 
these sectors. The Multi-Fiber Arrangement, which was a vast system of bilateral quantitative 
restrictions imposed by developed countries on their imports from developing countries, was 
a violation of the basic rules of the GATT. The same was true of agriculture. Table 4 
confirms that the food, clothing, and footwear sectors are indeed highly protected sectors, 
with average tariffs well above the average for the industrial sector as a whole, and with 
significant peak tariffs, particularly in agriculture. 
 
These three asymmetries are well-known. The question is whether they actually show up in 
the data on the patterns of trade. Furthermore, once these asymmetries are taken into account, 
                                                 
3 For a fuller discussion of the history and consequences of Article XVIII:B, see Eglin (1987) 
and WTO (2003).  6
would the data reveal that the WTO has promoted trade substantially and in the way it has 
been designed? The objective of this paper is to examine systematically this question. It is 
organized as follows. Section II presents the econometric model and estimation 
methodology, and briefly describes the data and their sources. Section III discusses the 
results. Section IV offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II.   ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
A.   Model and Estimation Issues 
We adopt an extended gravity model that has enjoyed empirical success in terms of its ability 
to explain a relatively large fraction of variations in the observed volume of trade. In theory, 
the gravity model can be justified by a variety of theories, including monopolistic 
competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1995) and a Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
specialization (Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1998; and Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). 
 
Empirically, it has been used to analyze the effects of regional trade blocs (see Frankel, 1997 
and the references cited therein) and currency unions (Frankel and Rose, 2000; Glick and 
Rose, 2002; Rose, 2000; and Persson, 2001) among other subjects. In contrast to a majority 
of earlier studies (and to Rose, 2002a), we adopt the version of the gravity model suggested 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) that includes country fixed effects in the regression. 
More precisely, our specification is of the following form: 
 
 
LogImport(j,k,t) = Z(j,k,t) γ + ∑ αi Mi + ∑ θh Xh+ β1FTA(j,k,t) + β2GSP(j,k,t) +  
       β 3WTO-DVED(j,k,t) + β4WTO-DING(j,k,t) + ej,k,t 
 
where Z(j,t) is a list of variables, including log GDP, log per capita GDP, log land area of 
importers and exporters, greater circle distance between j and k, dummies for common 
language and colonial links, shared borders, and currency, and a dummy for landlocked and 
island countries. Essentially, the list includes all the covariates in Rose (2002a).
4 
 
Mi’s are a list of importer dummies (that take the value of one if i=j, and zero otherwise).  
Xi’s are a list of exporter dummies (that take the value of one if h=k, and zero otherwise). The 
Mi’s and Xi’s are essentially dummies that serve to proxy for “multilateral resistance” in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
5 These dummies were not included in most of the 
regressions in Rose (2002a). 
                                                 
4 Because we include importer and exporter fixed effects (see below), we drop other country-
specific and time invariant covariates. 
5 Trade between two countries depends not just on the policy and physical barriers between 
them but also on the barriers between these countries and the rest of the world (hence the 
term “multilateral resistance”). Importer and exporter dummies proxy for the latter kind of 
barriers. One of our robustness checks involves taking the Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(continued…)  7
 
FTA(j,k,t) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if j and k belong to a common free 
trade area or common market in year t.
6 
 
GSP (j,k,t) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the importing industrial country 
grants preferences under the generalized scheme of preferences (GSP) to exporting country k 
in year t and where j and k are not members of a free trade area or common market in year t. 
 
WTO-DVED(j,k,t) is a dummy variable for importer j that is a developed country WTO 
member and where j and k are not in a common free trade area or customs union and where j 
does not grant GSP preferences to k in year t. 
 
WTO-DING(j,k,t) is a dummy variable for importer j that is a developing country WTO 
member and where j and k are not in a common free trade area or customs union and where j 
does not grant GSP preferences to k in year t. 
 
ej,k,t is a normally distributed random error term that has a zero mean and a constant variance. 
  
There are several important differences between our specification and that in Rose (2002a) 
that are worth making clear at the outset. First, we focus on imports by j from k as the 
regressand, whereas Rose focused on the average of j’s imports from k and j’s exports to k. 
All theories that underlie a gravity-like specification yield predictions on unidirectional trade 
rather than total trade. Hence, our specification is more closely grounded in theory. 
 
Moreover, the trade effects of the WTO and the GSP really relate to imports. When a country 
j grants GSP preferences to k, or when j liberalizes its imports under the WTO, there is 
reason to expect j's imports from k to increase but there is no theoretical reason why j's 
exports to k should also increase by the same proportion. Even if Abba Lerner symmetry 
were to hold—that is, removal of import barriers serves to raise exports as well as imports—
it would only do so at the level of a country’s aggregate rather than bilateral trade. 
 
The argument in favor of trade (exports plus imports) rather than imports could be based on 
the view that the WTO also regulates export taxes and export subsidies. In practice, export 
taxes have rarely, if ever, been the subject of liberalization negotiations, in part because 
industrial countries have seldom used them. Export subsidies, on the other hand, have been 
the focus of WTO rules and negotiations, but elimination of these subsidies would tend to 
reduce exports. The impact of the WTO on a measure of trade (regressand) that included 
exports would even in theory be ambiguous. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
(2003) results to its logical conclusion and incorporating time-varying importer and exporter 
fixed effects. 
6 The FTAs included in our analysis are those reported in Rose (2002a) and updated through 
2000. Appendix Table 6 lists all the FTAs used in our study.  8
Another reason for favoring trade would be that by joining the WTO a country gets the 
benefit of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and enjoys better export access to other 
markets. But this benefit can only be enjoyed if the partner country is also a WTO member 
country. For these reasons, Rose’s (2002a) attempt at measuring the impact of the WTO 
when only one of the two trading countries is in the WTO seems problematic.
7 
 
Another advantage of our specification is that we can meaningfully differentiate importer and 
exporter characteristics and their effects (e.g. importer’s log GDP and exporter’s log GDP as 
separate regressors) on trade, whereas Rose had to rely on a symmetric composite of the 
importer and exporter characteristics (e.g., the sum of the importer’s and exporter’s log 
GDP’s as a single regressor). Under our approach, for example, we can measure whether 
import liberalization benefits all exporters or just those that are members of the WTO. Thus, 
we are able to identify whether there is discrimination between WTO and non-WTO 
members and also to measure the potential public good benefits of the WTO. 
 
Second, as Deardorff (1998), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Wei (1996) 
emphasized, the standard gravity model might have been misspecified in ignoring a 
“multilateral resistance” or “remoteness” term. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggest 
that empirically, the inclusion of country fixed effects captures “multilateral resistance” 
reasonably well and thus corrects this misspecification. In Rose (2002a), the benchmark 
regression and indeed all specifications, save one, do not include country fixed effects. In our 
analysis, we include country fixed effects in all the specifications. 
 
Third, our specification of the GSP and WTO dummies is different from that in Rose. We 
rely on the fact that FTAs, the GSP, and the WTO involve different degrees of liberalization, 
and hence define them mutually exclusively in order to be able to isolate the impact of each, 
purged of any “contamination” from the other.
8 Therefore, the WTO dummies in our analysis 
are coded to exclude country pairs belonging to the same FTA/customs union agreement or 
involved in GSP relationships. Similarly, the GSP dummy is coded to exclude country pairs 
belonging to an FTA or customs union. 
 
B.   Data and Sources 
The data that we use and their sources are explained in detail in the Appendix. Most of our 
data are from Rose (2002a) which are posted on his website. The main difference is our use 
of imports rather than trade as the dependent variable which we obtain from the IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics. We deflate imports by the US consumer price index. Also we 
                                                 
7 The other dummy that Rose (2002a) uses to capture possible WTO effects, namely when 
both members in a country pair are WTO members, does not suffer from the deficiencies 
noted above. 
8We also report the results when these variables are defined as in Rose (2002a). It turns out 
that the GSP coefficients are affected much more than the WTO coefficients.  9
update all the Rose variables for the year 2000. Our panel data set consists of observations 
for every 5 years beginning in 1950. 
 
The tariff and import data we use for the disaggregated estimations are obtained respectively 
from the TRAINS (Trade Analysis Information Systems) and COMTRADE databases of the 
United Nations (See the Appendix for details). Descriptive statistics for the basic data are in 
Appendix Table 1. The list of countries in the aggregate and disaggregate estimations is 
presented in Appendix Tables 2–4. Consistent with WTO practice, but unlike Rose, we 
exclude South Africa, Turkey, and Yugoslavia from the category of industrial countries. The 
list of sectors used in the disaggregate estimations is in Appendix Table 5  The list of free 
trade areas is described in Appendix Table 6, while Appendix Table 7 provides data on the 
number of observations falling into the different categories (WTO, FTAs, GSP etc.). 
 
 
III.   RESULTS 
A.   Asymmetry Between Industrial and Developing Countries 
We now turn to the regression analysis. The basic gravity model, reported in Table 5, works 
well, yielding plausible estimates for the standard covariates—GDP, GDP per capita, 
distance—which are highly significant and very much in line with typical estimates from the 
literature. Tables 5 and 6 contain the core results for aggregate trade in panel and cross-
section contexts, respectively. The basic Rose result about the ineffectiveness of the WTO in 
increasing trade is illustrated in column 1.
 Indeed, if membership in the WTO is 
undifferentiated, with all countries treated alike, our result is a more damning indictment of 
the WTO than even that in Rose (2002a). He found that membership in the WTO had no 
significant effect on trade. We find that membership has a significantly negative effect on 
trade: the average WTO member trades about 11 percent [exp(–0.113)–1] less than the 
average in the sample (column 1). 
 
But as we explained in the earlier section, the evolution of the WTO and its precursor the 
GATT, most notably involving the special treatment of developing countries, makes it 
essential to treat this group differently from industrial countries. Once this is done as in 
column 2, we see that the average result of undertrading obscures a significant difference 
between the behavior of industrial country members of the WTO and its developing country 
members. The coefficient on the former is positive and highly significant. As will be seen, 
this is a result that is robust to a large number of changes in specification, estimation 
procedure, and sample. 
 
On the other hand, the coefficient on the developing country WTO importer dummy is 
negative and significant.
9 This negative sign, as it turns out, is not robust; indeed, it is quite 
fragile. For example, when we exclude observations with values of trade less than $500,000, 
                                                 
9 It is worth noting that t-statistics for the industrial country WTO dummy is almost always 
above 10, signifying that the coefficient estimates have a high degree of precision.  10
the negative coefficient turns positive and significant (column 4 of Table 5). There are 
plausible reasons to believe that small-valued observations are subject to sampling and 
measurement error. In particular, idiosyncratic shifts in the behavior of a single importer or 
even a single shipment may dominate the variations in the reported import value.
10 
 
Table 6 reports a sequence of cross-sectional estimations every five years from 1950 to 2000.  
The chief advantage of running separate regressions for different years is that the importer 
and exporter fixed effects are allowed to vary over time. This effectively permits the 
“multilateral resistance” in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to be time-varying.  The 
coefficients on other control variables are not restricted to be the same over time either.  The 
chief disadvantage of this approach is a possible loss of efficiency which, given the large size 
of the data set, is not a crucial loss.  In any case, the coefficients on the industrial country 
WTO dummy are positive, and significant for all years beginning in 1960. The coefficient on 
the developing country dummy is less stable: it is positive and significant in the early years 
but negative and usually insignificant for the rest of the estimations. 
 
This result is consistent with the history of asymmetric trade liberalization in the WTO that 
we described earlier. Industrial countries reduced their tariff barriers under successive trade 
rounds while developing countries were accorded the freedom to maintain their trade barriers 
under the principle of special and differential treatment. The known asymmetry in tariff 
reductions shows up nicely in the data. Changes in nontariff barriers are apparently not large 
enough to completely offset the tariff reductions. 
 
If these results are interpreted causally, we can quantify the contribution of the WTO to 
increasing global trade. The coefficient for the industrial country dummy in the panel 
regression reported in column 4 of Table 5 is 0.52. This implies that industrial countries’ 
bilateral imports has on average been about 65 percent more [exp(0.52)–1] by virtue of their 
membership in the WTO. Taken literally, our results would imply that in 2000 alone, 
aggregate imports of industrial countries would have been higher by about $3 trillion than 
without the WTO, representing about 44 percent of world trade. 
 
This estimate is probably overstated because it does not take into account a substitution 
effect: if one country joined the WTO its aggregate trade would increase as we have 
estimated it; but if all countries joined the WTO there would be some displacement of 
imports from non-WTO members by those from WTO members. Having said that, we note 
that there are also reasons that our estimates may have understated the true impact of the 
WTO membership in raising world trade if there is positive feedback from higher trade to 
higher economic growth (see Frankel and Romer, 1999), which in turn spurs even more trade 
(the gravity equation examines trade for a given level of income). Of course, if the WTO had 
not accorded the freedom to developing countries to maintain trade barriers, and had required 
trade liberalization of them, the positive impact on global trade could have been greater still. 
                                                 
10 For these reasons, the remaining results reported in the paper will exclude observations 
with trade values less than $500,000, although we would emphasize that not doing so does 
not alter the basic nature of the results.  11
 
Some additional features of the world trading system are brought out by the results. Members 
of the WTO are obliged to extend trade privileges granted to any country (member or non-
member) to all other members of the WTO under the MFN principle. But members are not 
obliged to extend the same privilege to non-members of the WTO. They can do so if they 
wish but there is no legal obligation to do so. In practice, do they? 
 
In column 5 of Table 5, each of the two WTO dummies is disaggregated into two dummies, 
depending on whether the exporter is also a WTO member. For industrial country WTO 
members, the coefficients on the dummy when the exporter is also a WTO member is greater 
than when the exporter is not a member (0.62 versus 0.34) and this difference is statistically 
significant.
11 It appears that non-members do not seem to benefit equally from the 
liberalization under the WTO. This difference, which highlights the benefits of WTO 
membership, could arise for two reasons. The first is explicit discrimination; that is, barriers 
could be higher against imports from non-WTO members than from members. The second is 
akin to a product composition effect: that is, even though all goods are treated alike 
regardless of their provenance, barriers are higher on products of greater interest to non-
members because these products have not been the subject of the reciprocity negotiations in 
the WTO.
12 Being out of the WTO can thus have two types of disadvantages. 
 
This result, however, also points to the possible public good benefit of the WTO. The fact 
that imports from WTO non-members is positive and significant rather than zero could arise 
from the fact that WTO members extend some of the privileges of their WTO-induced 
liberalization to non-members. In our results, the public good benefit amounts to about 
40 percent [exp(0.34)–1] additional exports for non-members to industrial country WTO 
members. 
 
In Table 7, we put our core specification through the usual hoops—the robustness-checks 
exercise. As the Table confirms, our core result—particularly the positive impact of the 
WTO on industrial countries’ imports—remains unchanged. The hoops include: adding time-
varying importer and exporter fixed effects, quadratic gravity terms, using Rose’s (2002a) 
definition of the GSP and WTO dummies, using alternative estimation procedures: weighted 
least squares (with trade, real GDP, and real GDP per capita as weights), country-pair 
random effects, country-pair random effects with importer and exporter fixed effects, and 
country-pair fixed effects, and finally, discarding outlying observations.
13 
 
                                                 
11 The F-test (with a value of 48.0) suggests that the null hypothesis of the equality of 
coefficients is easily rejected. 
12 We are grateful to Alan Winters for drawing our attention to this point. 
13 Specifically, we discard values of the dependent variable that are three and two standard 
deviations away from the mean, respectively.  12
In all cases, the industrial country dummy is highly significant and the magnitude of the 
coefficient remains broadly stable. We would draw particular attention to the first row in 
Table 7, which includes time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects. In economic term, 
this specification allows multilateral resistance a la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to 
change over time in the panel regression. Qualitatively, this extension does not change our 
basic conclusion.  In fact, our results are even stronger in the sense that the industrial country 
WTO dummy increases in size while remaining significant.
14  
 
The only case in Table 7 where the industrial country coefficient declines significantly is in 
the specification with country-pair fixed effects estimations, where the coefficient value 
declines to 0.32, while remaining statistically significant. Conceptually, the specification that 
includes the country-pair fixed effects asks a “within” question: what does joining the WTO 
do to the import pattern?  The specifications that exclude country-pair fixed effects but 
otherwise include importer and exporter fixed effects ask a different, “between” question: do 
WTO members exhibit a different trade patterns from non-members?  Our paper has been 
focusing mostly on the “between” question and demonstrates that industrial country WTO 
members are significantly more open than non-members. On the “within” question, the effect 
is smaller numerically but still positive and non-trivial in economic term. The developing 
country dummy is generally positive and significant but the magnitudes are typically very 
small.  
 
B.   Asymmetries Between New and Old Developing Country Members 
The next question we address is whether there has been any change in the trading patterns of 
WTO members in the recent past. There is a priori reason to expect changes because it is 
widely believed that the Uruguay Round marked a watershed in the status of developing 
countries in the WTO. Specifically, special and differential treatment came under attack in 
the Uruguay Round. A concerted effort was supposedly made to ensure that developing 
countries were integrated into the trading system, most notably by requiring them to take on 
more obligations to liberalize their trade regimes. A related development was on the front of 
new entrants to the WTO. By many accounts, post-Uruguay Round accessions are supposed 
to have been qualitatively different in the sense of extracting more trade liberalizing 
concessions from prospective entrants. But does the data support the proposition that the 
Uruguay Round really marked a watershed for developing countries? 
 
Table 8 attempts to shed light on this question. For the purposes of this table, developing 
country members are disaggregated into those that were members prior to the Uruguay 
Round (“old members”) and those that joined after it (“new members”). Given that the 
Uruguay Round negotiations lasted eight years, the question arises as to what is the 
                                                 
14 Including time-varying fixed effects increases dramatically the number of parameters to be 
estimated (about 300-350 parameters for each time period). Because of computational 
limitations, the sample for this specification had to be restricted to data for every ten rather 
than every 5 years beginning in 1950. The resulting sample contained 28667 observations 
compared with 55831 observation in the core specification.  13
appropriate cut-off date that distinguishes a possible regime change in the way the WTO 
treated its old and new members. 
 
One possibility would be to make 1995—the date of the formal creation of the WTO—as the 
cut-off date. But this would be too legalistic; indeed the creation of the WTO with its notion 
of a single undertaking—whereby all countries adhered to all the Uruguay Round  
agreements—was the culmination of the process of integrating developing countries into the 
trading system.
15 In the absence of a strong justification for any one particular date, we allow 
the data to tell us whether and when there was a regime shift. Therefore, in our regressions, 
we successively define new members as those that joined after 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 
1994, and 1995. We then test the hypothesis that WTO membership had a different impact on 
trade for these new members compared with the old ones. 
 
These results are reported in Table 8. Regressions for the year 2000 are reported in columns 
1–6 while those for 1995 are in columns 7–11. Three features stand out. First, the regressions 
for 2000 indicate that the coefficient on the new WTO member dummy is positive and 
significant for all definitions of new members except when 1995 is used as the cut-off date 
for defining new members. The average coefficient value is about 0.28, representing extra 
trade of about 30 percent for new members. 
 
Second, in the regressions for 2000, the coefficients of the new and old dummies are 
significantly different from each other except when 1995 is used as the cut-off date for 
defining new members.
16 This is suggestive of a regime change. 
 
But how is one to reconcile regime change with the fact that the coefficient on new members 
becomes smaller in size and statistically insignificant when 1995 is used as the cut-off date?  
A plausible explanation is that the lag between the start of WTO membership and detectable 
liberalization efforts is longer than 5 years.  Indeed, developing countries are often given 
very long periods, sometimes up to 15 years, to phase in their liberalization.  
 
Columns 7–11 shed some light on this issue by reporting regressions for bilateral imports in 
1995, when little time has elapsed for the new WTO members. The coefficients on new 
members that were significant in the 2000 trade equation become small and insignificant. 
These results are consistent with the practice of having the liberalization obligations phased 
in over a period of time. Countries that joined in the early 1990s experienced no significant 
increase in openness in 1995 but by 2000 they appear to have done so that was worth about 
an extra 30 percent of trade. 
 
                                                 
15 In private correspondence, Patrick Low of the WTO suggests that a date as early as the 
Mexican accession to the GATT in 1986 could be seen as the beginning of the process of 
integrating developing countries into the trading system. 
16 As Table 8 shows, the null hypothesis for equality of coefficients is rejected by the F-tests 
at the 1 or 5 percent level in 5 of the 6 regressions.  14
We would note, however, that the coefficient on old developing country members is still not 
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that their obligations to liberalize even 
after the Uruguay Round have not become stringent enough to actually lead them to be more 
open than non-WTO members. Evidently, eliminating special and differential still has a long 
way to go. 
 
These are important findings because they sit at odds with the popular view that developing 
countries were actually integrated into the trading system in the aftermath of the Uruguay 
Round. In trade terms this did not happen for the old members of the WTO. Although 
developing countries’ bound tariffs may have come down in the Uruguay Round, actual 
tariffs barely budged. 
 
Table 9 shows that, although the percentage of tariff lines for which bindings (commitments) 
were taken on by developing countries increased by 50 percentage points due to the Uruguay 
Round, the actual tariff reductions brought about by the Round were much smaller: only 27 
percent of tariff lines involved reductions in applied tariffs, and on these, the reduction was 8 
percent. In other words, if tariff reductions are calculated on all tariff lines, the reduction 
would be about 2 percent. This lack of reductions in applied tariffs appears to be reflected in 
our result that old WTO members continued to be no more open than non-members even 
after the Uruguay Round. The irony relating to S&D in the Uruguay Round was that it was 
eliminated in areas—such as TRIPs—where maintaining it may actually have been welfare-
enhancing. But S&D was preserved in the conventional area of trade liberalization in goods 
where its dilution would have been unambiguously welfare-enhancing. 
 
C.   Asymmetries Between Sectors 
In this sub-section, we turn our attention to the asymmetry in the trade liberalization across 
sectors. The proposition that we wish to test is whether WTO membership has a differential 
impact for the industrial countries between protected and unprotected sectors. If WTO 
membership is a proxy for trade liberalization, then it should have had a greater impact on 
trade volumes where barriers came down compared with sectors where barriers have 
remained high. 
 
To explore this issue, we go to a recently available data set on disaggregated bilateral trade 
(disaggregated at the Harmonized System (HS) 4-digit level) that was not used by Rose 
(2002 a or b).
17 We adopt a two-step strategy. In the first step, we identify sectors that are 
commonly considered to be highly protected by developed countries and sectors that are 
supposed to have been liberalized. In the second step, we fit a variation of the augmented 
gravity model to these data. The objective is to see whether actual patterns of trade volume 
reflect the known difference in trade barriers.
18 
                                                 
17 Rose (2002a) does suggest that a sectoral analysis could shed further light on the impact of 
WTO membership. 
18 For details of the data used in this part of the analysis see the Appendix, while Appendix 
Table 2 provides the list of countries covered.  15
 
We begin by describing how we select disaggregated tariff categories into the highly 
protected and liberalized sectors. First, we sort United States (ad valorem) MFN tariff rates at 
the HS 4-digit level (on imports from other developed WTO members) in 1990 and 2001 in 
descending order.  We do the same for the European Union’s tariff rates. 
 
Second, we identify the set of 4-digit sectors in which both the United States and the EU 
have tariff rates that are greater than ten percent in both years. Note that these sectors may 
have additional specific tariffs. A complete list of these products is presented in Appendix 
Table 3. These 4-digit sectors can be broadly grouped into four categories: agricultural 
products, clothing, footwear, and other highly protected manufactured products. For each 
country pair and year, we then sum up the 4-digit imports within each of the four categories. 
Note that the data base does not have information on non-tariff barriers at this level of 
disaggregation. Therefore, while we are confident that the sectors that we have chosen are 
highly protected by developed countries, we cannot be sure if we have left out some other 
highly protected sectors (due to nontariff barriers). 
 
Third, we also collect the set of 4-digit sectors that both the United States and the EU have 
zero ad valorem and specific tariff rates. We take out agricultural products and raw materials 
from this list on the ground that there may be various non-tariff barriers that the information 
in the data base does not capture. We label the remaining set of zero-tariff 4-digit sectors as 
unprotected sectors. 
 
We specify a system of five equations, one for each of the following sectors: (i) unprotected 




LogImport(j,k,S,t) = Z(j,t) γl + ∑ αi Mi +  ∑ θhl Xh+ β1lFTA(j,k,t) + β2lGSP(j,k,t) 
         + β3l WTO-DVED(j,k,t) + β4lWTO-DING(j,k,t) + ej,k,l,t                
  
 
where S is an index representing the 5 sectors for which this equation is estimated. The 
regressors are common for all the equations. The equations have the standard gravity 
formulations and are identical to that described in Section II. Since the error terms in the five 
equation are potentially correlated, we estimate the five equations jointly using the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. Allowing such cross-equation error 
correlations makes SUR more general than OLS. Each of the five equations has importer and 
exporter fixed effects and year effects. To allow for maximum flexibility, we do not restrict 
the parameters on similar regressors in different equations to be the same. 
 
The hypothesis that we test is a simple one. Sectors with the highest protection in industrial 
countries are those where the WTO has been least successful. Hence, WTO membership 
should have less impact than in sectors characterized by low levels of protection. 
  16
The United Nations WITS trade database has disaggregated data beginning in 1989. 
Consistent with our aggregate estimations reported earlier, we use data for 1990, 1995, and 
2000 and discard observations with import values less than US$500,000. 
 
Table 10 presents the results for these estimations. The results for the sector with low 
protection (column 1) are consistent with the results for aggregate trade: for example, the 
industrial country WTO dummy is positive and highly significant with a coefficient value of 
0.62 which is greater than the coefficient value of 0.5 in the aggregate estimations. We would 
expect WTO membership to lead to greater trade where it has effected greater liberalization 
and this is confirmed by our results. The developing country WTO dummy is positive and 
insignificant as in the aggregate estimations. This is therefore a reassuring benchmark against 
which we can compare the results for the protected sectors. 
 
For three of the four protected sectors—clothing, footwear and other manufacturing—the 
coefficients of the industrial country dummy are insignificantly different from zero. 
Formally, they are also significantly smaller than the coefficient in the unprotected sector.
19 
This provides confirmation that the WTO has not had any significant impact on trade in these 
sectors as we have postulated.
20 For the fourth sector—agriculture—the industrial country 
WTO dummy is negative and significant.  It appears that the exemption of agriculture from 
WTO disciplines has provided the freedom to industrial countries to throttle trade by 
introducing very high levels of protection. The permissiveness toward agriculture has proved 
very costly indeed because the coefficient estimates suggest that the typical industrial country 
imports of agricultural products is about 60 percent [exp(–0.87)–1] less than that of the 
average importer in our sample. 
 
D.   Industrial Country Effect or WTO Effect? 
One of our main and robust findings is that industrial country WTO membership is 
associated with greater trade. In most years in our sample, however, all industrial countries 
are WTO members. How can we be sure that we are picking up a WTO effect rather than an 
industrial country effect? 
 
In response we would make a number of points. First, insofar as industrial countries have 
several distinguishing characteristics collectively and individually we control for them 
respectively through our various covariates—GDP, per capita GDP, proximity etc.—and our 
importer and exporter fixed effects. In other words, the results on the WTO dummy do not 
follow simply because they are richer or larger than other countries or in some ways 
                                                 
19 The hypothesis that the coefficient of the industrial country WTO dummy in the 
unprotected sector is equal to that in each of the protected sectors is rejected in three 
instances at the 1 percent level and in one instance at the 10 percent level (the chi-square 
values are reported in Table 10). 
20 The developing country WTO dummy is also insignificant in three of the four protected 
sectors. 
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geographically or historically distinctive. Nevertheless, it is still possible that there are 
residual characteristics of industrial countries that are unobservable and therefore omitted 
from our set of regressors, biasing our results. 
 
Second, we also obtain and report some more direct evidence in favor of a WTO rather than 
an industrial country effect.  It turns out that in the early years of our sample (1950-1965), a 
number of industrial countries (Germany, Austria, and Iceland among others) were not WTO 
members. We run panel and cross-section regressions for these years and, in addition to the 
usual industrial country WTO variable, add an industrial country WTO non-member 
variable. The results are reported in Table 11.  The panel regression (column 1) shows that 
the while both industrial country WTO member and industrial country non-member 
coefficients are positive and significant, the two are significantly different from each other.
21 
The difference in the values of the coefficients suggests that an industrial country WTO 
member importing 200 percent more than an industrial country non-member.
22 The year-by-
year results (columns 2-5), also confirms, in 3 out of the 4 time periods, an economically and 
statistically significant difference in the importing patterns between industrial country WTO 
members and non-members. 
 
Third, there is additional evidence suggesting a distinct WTO effect rather than a pure 
industrial country effect. As Table 10 reports, consistent with the actual patterns of trade 
liberalization by industrialized countries, the WTO coefficient is different between protected 
and unprotected sectors. As Column 5 in Tables 5 reports,  for industrial country importers, 
that the import volume depends on whether the exporters are members of the WTO or not.  
As Table 6 reports, the GSP and WTO coefficients are different for industrial countries. All 
these results suggest that it is trade and trade policy factors rather than industrial country 
status per se that underlie these differences. 
 
There is a separate question of whether industrial country liberalization would have taken 
place without the GATT/WTO. This paper does not and cannot address this question. 
However, if the null hypothesis is that the various rounds of liberalization under the 
GATT/WTO have not generated discernible patterns in trade volumes, the evidence in this 
paper can reject that hypothesis. 
 
Even on the broader “counterfactual” question, we would say that the evidence is suggestive 
of a positive role for the GATT/WTO. It should be understood in this context that the 
GATT/WTO represents a reciprocity framework, which facilitates import liberalization by 
harnessing the countervailing power of export interests to overcome the resistance from 
import-competing interests. So the question whether liberalization would have happened 
                                                 
21 The F-test (value of 41.7) rejects the hypothesis of the equality of the two coefficients. 
22 The absolute value of the industrial country coefficients is high and greater than the 
average of the cross-section values possibly because of the fact that the fixed effects in the 
panel regression are not time-varying.  But even the difference in the WTO member and non-
member coefficients in the cross-section results point to a large WTO effect.    18
without the GATT/WTO is really one about the effectiveness of and need for a reciprocity 
framework. 
 
Did the reciprocity framework work? A few examples suggest that it did. The first was, of 
course, the successive multilateral rounds of tariff liberalization involving the United States 
and Europe. The second, more subtle example of the success of reciprocity comes from the 
highly protected sectors in industrial countries. Barriers in agricultural, clothing, and 
footwear have remained high in part because the reciprocity framework was implicitly 
absent: by embracing the right to protect their own markets (under the concept of special and 
differential treatment), developing countries opted out of the reciprocity framework, relieving  
the pressure on industrial countries to reduce barriers in these sectors. And when developing 
countries started to engage in the reciprocity framework in the Uruguay Round, progress was 
made, albeit limited, in bringing down industrial country barriers in agriculture and clothing. 
 
 
E.   Other Results 
Our analysis also yields a number of additional findings that are worth noting. The first 
relates to the complaint that industrial countries’ trade policies discriminate against 
developing countries. Industrial country tariffs are highest in agriculture, textiles and clothing 
which are sectors of particular export interest to developing countries. This elicits the claim 
(e.g., Oxfam, 2003) about the unfairness of industrial countries’ trade policies. Column 6 of 
Table 5 sheds light on this question. The coefficient of the dummy relating to industrial 
country imports from other industrial countries is greater than that relating to imports from 
developing countries (where both types of exporters are WTO members) and this difference 
is statistically different.
23 In other words, industrial countries do appear to trade more 
amongst themselves than with developing countries, ceteris paribus. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients suggest that trade with developing countries is about 32 percent less than trade 
with other industrial countries. But we cannot definitively assign this difference to higher 
barriers rather than to other factors that we may not have controlled for such as product 
composition, differential transportation costs etc. 
 
The second finding relates to the role of the GSP. As in Rose (2002a), GSP imparts a positive 
fillip to trade. The GSP coefficients are always positive and statistically and economically 
significant. But there is a disparity in the magnitude of the effects, with our results suggesting 
that the WTO has a greater economic impact than the GSP. 
 
The proper comparison is between industrial country imports under the GSP and under the 
WTO. Columns 4 and 6 of Table 5 allows us to answer this question. Column (4) suggests 
that, in terms of industrial country imports, the GSP effect (coefficient value of 0.39) is 
smaller than the WTO (0.52) effect. Even if we compare industrial country imports from 
developing countries under the GSP and the WTO, we find that the GSP (coefficient value of 
                                                 
23 The F-test (with a value of 15.0) suggests that the null hypothesis of equality of the two 
coefficients is rejected at the 5 percent level.  19
0.36)  has a smaller effect than the WTO (0.44). In principle, these coefficients should be 
different from each other because the GSP provides for duty-free access for certain sectors 
whereas under the WTO the access is subject to the MFN tariff which is always non-
negative. The smaller GSP coefficient suggests that product exclusions and the other 
restrictions under the GSP mitigate its benefits to an extent that makes it not very different 
from liberalization under the WTO.
24 
 
The third finding relates to the evolution in the various coefficients over time (Table 6). It is 
interesting that the magnitude of the coefficients on the FTA, GSP, and WTO dummies 
declines over time. The FTA dummy declines from 2.0 in 1970 to 0.7 in 2000 while the GSP 
dummy declines from 2.2 in 1975 to 0.5 in 2000. One reason for the decline in the FTA and 
GSP coefficients could be the reduction in average MFN tariffs—brought about by  
liberalization under the WTO—which reduces the value of preferential access under the GSP 
and free trade agreements. The temporal behavior of these coefficients could either be a 
testimony to the benefits of the WTO or to unilateral liberalization around the globe. 
 
Can one explain the decline in the magnitude of the WTO coefficient itself? We would 
suggest two possible answers. First, imports by non-members of the WTO could be 
increasing at a differentially rapid pace because of unilateral liberalization by them. Second, 
it could also be the case that as the WTO expands its membership, bringing within its fold a 
larger share of world trade, the distinction between WTO and non-WTO membership 
diminishes. Our analysis does not allow us to isolate these different effects. 
 
We would conclude this section with some observations on methodology and in particular on 
the performance of the gravity model as we have specified it. The gravity model appears to 
perform well in the sense that its results seem to be consistent with what we know about the 
operation of the WTO, GSP, and FTAs individually and relative to each other. The trading 
system more broadly seems to be well explained by the gravity specifications. 
 
First, in the aggregate panel estimations (Table 5), the FTA coefficient is significantly 
different from the WTO coefficient consistent with the former effecting deeper liberalization 
by reducing tariffs to zero.
25 In the disaggregated estimations (Table 10), this pattern 
continues to hold for the protected sectors.  Furthermore, the fact that the industrial country 
WTO coefficient is greater in the unprotected sectors (column 1 of Table 10) than in 
aggregate (column 4 of Table 5) is also consistent with our priors that WTO membership 
should lead to more trade precisely where the institution has presided over greater 
liberalization.  
                                                 
24 When we defined the GSP and WTO dummies in a manner consistent with Rose (2002a), 
we find that the GSP dummy becomes negative and insignificant, while the industrial country 
WTO dummy remains positive and significant, albeit with a lower point estimate of 0.21 
(Table 7). This is to be expected, as we are looking for the trade effect of the GSP over and 
above any WTO effect. 
25 The F-test (value of 96.7) rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of coefficients.  20
 
Second, the GSP dummies are insignificant in three of the four protected sectors which is 
consistent with the observation that industrial countries have tended to exempt the most 
protected sectors from the benefits granted to developing countries under the GSP program.
26 
 
Finally, in Appendix Table 8, we replicate Rose’s results and report some variations. The 
main result is that Rose’s results appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of country fixed 
effects:
27 when the country effects are included, the WTO dummy (when both countries are 
members) becomes positive and significant, with the point estimate suggesting greater trade 
for the average WTO member of between 14 and 35 percent over nonmembers. 
 
 
IV.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Rose (2002a) has seriously called into question the effectiveness and hence the usefulness of 
the WTO as a multilateral institution. His analysis implies that the WTO, whose raison d’être 
is to promote trade, has failed to do so. 
 
Our paper shows, however, that the GATT/WTO has done a splendid job of promoting trade 
wherever it was designed to do so and correspondingly failed to promote trade where the 
design of rules militated against it. The WTO has served to increase industrial country 
imports substantially, possibly by about 68 percent, the result of successive rounds of tariff 
liberalization. But it has done a less good job of increasing the imports of developing 
countries because developing countries were essentially exempted from the basic 
GATT/WTO mission of progressively lowering import barriers under the so-called principle 
of special and differential treatment. Luckily, given that industrial countries have accounted 
for nearly two-thirds of global imports during the period 1950–2000, the positive impact on 
global trade has been substantial, creating an additional 44 percent worth of current world 
trade. 
 
It is important to stress that the above does not imply that developing countries have not 
benefited from WTO membership.  A distinction needs to be made between developing 
country WTO members as exporters and importers.  Our results suggest that there has been 
little impact of WTO membership on developing countries’ imports.  But the positive impact 
of WTO membership on industrial country imports meant that imports from developing 
countries (namely, developing country exports) also increased significantly.  Developing 
country exports to industrial countries, on our estimates, were at least one-third greater 
because of developing country WTO membership.  
                                                 
26 Mattoo and others (2003) document this for the U.S. GSP scheme. 
27 See the coefficient of the WTO dummy (when both are members) in columns 2 and 4 in 
Appendix Table 8 which include fixed effects and their counterpart specification without 
fixed effects (columns 1 and 3, respectively).  This is recognized but not emphasized in Rose 
(2002a).  21
  
Second, there is some evidence that this permissiveness of the WTO toward developing 
countries has changed since the Uruguay Round. The good news is that new members are 
significantly different from old members in that membership in the WTO for the former 
group is associated with an increase in imports of close to 30 percent relative to nonmembers. 
The bad news is that the Uruguay Round has had little effect on the old members, who 
continue to be no more open than non-WTO members even in the aftermath of the Round. 
Special and differential treatment of developing countries is therefore alive and well for the 
old members of the GATT/WTO. The latter is consistent with the actual pattern of trade 
liberalization undertaken, or rather not undertaken, by developing countries in the Uruguay 
Round. 
 
Third, WTO membership in sectors with high protection in the industrial countries—food, 
clothing, and footwear—has had no impact on trade. The link between protection and trade is 
discernible in the data. 
 
Indeed, our paper is also very reassuring about the basic gravity model as we have specified 
it. The results are consistent with what one knows about the way the WTO, GSP, and FTAs 
work individually and relative to each other. The trading system as a whole seems to be well 
explained by appropriately specified gravity equations. 
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Appendix. Data Description and Sources 
 
Aggregate estimations 
Estimating the model requires data on bilateral aggregate trade, incomes, population, 
distance, as well as geographical, cultural, and historical information. The study uses a panel 
data set which covers 172 Fund member countries during the five-year periods from 1950 
to 2000. The list of countries in the sample is presented in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Our data set is a slightly modified and updated version of Rose’s (2002a) data set, which is 
downloadable from Andrew Rose’s web-site. That paper describes the data set in detail, and 
we will only comment on a few data issues here. We use bilateral imports rather than trade as 
the regressand which we obtain from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Bilateral 
imports are those reported by the importing country and measured in U.S. dollars and 
deflated by US CPI (1982–1983 prices) for urban areas (available from freelunch.com).  
Real GDP, per capita GDP and population data for 2000 come from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI). WTO and FTA dummies for 2000 are extended based on the 
information available from the WTO official web site (wto.org). 
 
Data and sources for disaggregated estimations 
The TRAINS (Trade Analysis Information System) of the UNCTAD contains information on 
tariff and nontariff barriers at the most detailed commodity level. We utilize the US and EU 




Our objective is to determine the list of industries subject to high and zero protection both in 
the US and EU for 1989 and 2001 respectively.
29 We use ad valorem rates for these 
purposes.
30 For each product at 4-digit disaggregation level we calculate a simple average of 
ad valorem rates applied to all 8-digit subsections within that product. We treat a given 
industry as protected if its average ad valorem tariff rate both in the US and the EU exceeded 
10 percent. Similarly, a given 4-digit industry is considered to be unprotected if all the 8-digit 
subsections have zero tariffs (both ad valorem and non-ad valorem). 
                                                 
28 The 1989 EU tariff lines do not have MFN rates but instead conventional and autonomous 
rates are reported. We treat conventional tariff rates as MFN rates since they apply to the 
imports originating in WTO member countries. When conventional tariff rates do not exist 
for a product the autonomous rates are applied. 
29 The last two decades witnessed gradual decline in trade barriers. For industries with no 
protection we use 1989 data since industries that were not subject to trade barriers are also 
likely to be so in 2001. Applying the same logic we use 2001 tariff schedules for the list of 
highly protected industries. 
30 We cannot make use of non-ad valorem tariff rates since their use requires information on 
prices.   23
There are thirty three and forty one 4-digit industries that qualify as protected and 
unprotected, respectively. For each protected and unprotected industry, we obtain bilateral 
import data in 1990, 1995, and 2000 which cover 147 countries. The import data which come 
from the United Nations’ COMTRADE database are disaggregated at the HS 1988/1992, 4-
digit level and are deflated by US urban CPI (1982–1984 prices).
31 We define four broad 
product categories—food, clothing, footwear, and miscellaneous manufacturing and, then, 
sort protected and unprotected industries by categories.
32 Not surprisingly, all unprotected 
industries fall into the miscellaneous manufacturing category. For a given year and country 
pair we obtain the value of imports in each broad category by summing bilateral imports of 
all products within that category. Thus, for protected industries our data contain bilateral 
imports in food, clothing, footwear, and manufacturing. All industries with zero tariff rates 
are aggregated into unprotected manufacturing. The remaining variables are the same as 
those used in the aggregate estimations. 
 
                                                 
31 Since the list of unprotected industries is obtained using tariff line for 2001 which is 
reported in HS 1996 classification, we use the concordance from HS 1996 to HS 1988/1992. 
32 See Appendix Table 3 for the list of industries by level of protection and broad category.  24
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Round Weighted  Tariff 
Reduction 
Implied Tariff Level 
at period beginning  
2/ 
1948–63  First five GATT rounds 
 (1947–62) a/ 
36 percent  15.4 
1968–72  Kennedy Round (1964–67) b/  37 percent  11.3 
1980–87  Tokyo Round (1973–79) c/  33 percent  8.3 
1995–99  Uruguay Round d/  38 percent  6.2 
 
Source: WTO website: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/22fact_e.htm 
 
1/  Industrial products excluding petroleum. 
2/  Derived from column 3 and applied to the 2001 tariff level of 4.5 percent reported in Finger, Ingco, and 
Reincke (1996). 
a/  US only. 
b/  US, Japan, EC(6), and UK. 
c/  US, EU(9), Japan, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 







Table 2: Percentage of Tariffs “Bound” in the GATT Prior to Uruguay Round 1/ 
 
  Industrial Countries 2/  Developing Countries 3/ 
Industrial Products  84.7  31.8 
All Merchandise Trade  80.2  30.1 
Source: Table G.2 in Finger, Ingco, and Reincke (1996). 
 
1/ The term “bound” refers to the commitment by countries in the WTO not to raise tariffs beyond a certain 
level. The fewer the “bound” tariffs, the less the commitment to liberalize trade barriers. The percentages are 
weighted averages over all product groups and by each country’s MFN imports. 
2/ Includes Australia, Austria, Canada, Switzerland, European Union, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, and the U.S. 
3/ Includes 21 countries for which data are available in the WTO’s Integrated Data Base (see Table 1 in Finger, 
Ingco, and Reincke, 1996). 
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Table 3.  Use of Trade Restrictions for Balance of Payments Reasons in the GATT/WTO: Selected 
Examples 1/   
      
     Years of  Duration 2/  
     Invocation 2/      
Argentina  early 1970s–91  Approx. 20  
Bangladesh early  1970s–  30+   
Brazil 1949–95  46   
Chile  1949–late 70s   Approx. 30  
Colombia 1985–92  7   
Egypt mid-1960s–95  Approx.  30  
Ghana  late 1950s–late 80s  Approx. 30  
India 1949–2000  51   
Indonesia  late 1950s–early 80s Approx. 30  
Korea  1968–late 80s  Approx. 30  
Nigeria 1984–98  14   
Pakistan 1949–2001  52 
Peru  late 1960s–91  Approx. 30  
Philippines 1980–95  15   
Sri Lanka  1949–98  49   
Tunisia mid-1960s–97  Approx.  30  
Turkey   mid-1950s–97  Approx.  40  
Sources:  GATT/WTO documents and Eglin, World Economy (1987). 
 
1/  This table does not necessarily indicate how long countries have actually been using quantitative restrictions; 
rather, it refers to how long countries have sought legal cover for them in the GATT/WTO under Articles XII:B 
and hence escaped multilateral pressure to eliminate the measures.  The table does not include all countries that 
have invoked the balance-of-payments exceptions to justify trade restrictions. 





Sources: United Nations, WITS Trade Database. 
 
The average and maximum tariffs are unweighted averages of HS-8 digit tariff lines that make up the 
corresponding HS 4-digit categories listed in Appendix Table 3 and grouped under the 4 categories in this table.
Sector Max.  Average  Max.  Average  Max.  Average  Max.  Average 
Clothing  23 16 36 17 13 12  33 13
Food  180 25 25 14 75 17  350 28
Footwear  20 13 48 25 17 17  48 22
Misc.  manufactures  28 12 38 14 22 13  38 14
Table 4. Tariffs in Highly Protected Sectors in the United States and European Union, 1989 and 2001 
1989 2001 
EU  US EU US 28
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log distance -1.230 -1.229 -0.925 -0.926 -0.919 -0.912
0.020 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
Log real GDP importer 0.718 0.821 0.457 0.495 0.538 0.542
0.065 0.064 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.051
Log real GDP partner -0.332 -0.276 0.115 0.147 0.115 0.105
0.070 0.069 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
Log real GDP per capita importer -0.232 -0.336 -0.001 -0.040 -0.084 -0.086
0.059 0.058 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
Log real GDP per capita partner 0.908 0.858 0.368 0.339 0.365 0.376
0.064 0.064 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
Common language 0.323 0.307 0.141 0.135 0.130 0.130
0.038 0.037 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
Common border 0.145 0.161 0.026 0.031 0.026 0.024
0.087 0.085 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.064
Common colony 0.553 0.553 0.527 0.529 0.528 0.515
0.058 0.057 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
Current colony 0.849 0.818 0.936 0.925 0.940 0.947
0.183 0.185 0.138 0.139 0.137 0.136
Ever colony 1.353 1.352 1.151 1.151 1.157 1.158
0.090 0.088 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
Common country 0.272 0.271 -0.658 -0.656 -0.701 -0.694
0.656 0.658 0.527 0.528 0.529 0.527
Common currency 1.051 1.046 0.713 0.714 0.728 0.732
0.110 0.109 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080
Free trade area 0.712 1.172 0.780 0.971 0.988 0.997
0.082 0.078 0.048 0.052 0.052 0.052
Industrial country importer granting GSP  0.324 1.270 0.042 0.393 0.399 0.389
0.048 0.077 0.038 0.056 0.056 0.056
Importer WTO member -0.113 0.140
0.027 0.022
Industrial country importer WTO member 0.911 0.521
0.069 0.049
Developing country importer WTO member -0.255 0.072
0.029 0.023
Industrial country importer and partner WTO members 0.619
0.050
Industrial country  importer WTO member, but not partner 0.339 0.326
0.058 0.058
Developing country importer and partner WTO members 0.043 0.027
0.024 0.024
Developing country  importer WTO member, but not partner 0.113 0.098
0.041 0.041
Industrial country importer WTO member, partner industrial country and WTO member 0.706
0.053
Industrial country importer WTO member, partner developing country and WTO member 0.532
0.058
Importer and exporter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 76094 76094 55831 55831 55831 55831
Sample All imports excluding values less than $500,000
R-square 0.702 0.704 0.714 0.715 0.715 0.715
Root mean square error 1.781 1.776 1.171 1.169 1.168 1.168
F-test 1/ 15.78, 96.66, 129.31 48.04, 2.97 11.97, 20.72
1/ Column 4. Numbers correspond to the following three null hypotheses: GSP=WTO, FTA=WTO, FTA=GSP
Column 5. Exporter in WTO = Exporter not in WTO for industrial country and developing country WTO importers, respectively
Column 6. Industrial country WTO exporter = Developing country WTO exporter  for industrial country imports; and
exporter not WTO member  = developing country WTO exporter for industrial country imports
All imports
Table 5.  Core Regressions.  Panel, 1950-2000
Regressand: log real imports. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) reported below coefficient estimates. 29
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Free trade area n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.196 1.988 1.809 1.956 1.008 1.078 0.842 0.701
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.247 0.208 0.169 0.167 0.161 0.147 0.122 0.081
Industrial country importer GSP member n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.138 2.185 2.180 0.844 0.525 0.533 0.465
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 0.342 0.197 0.187 0.191 0.173 0.153 0.109
Industrial country importer WTO member 0.57 0.07 0.47 1.385 1.901 2.184 2.277 1.113 0.867 0.652 0.670
0.33 0.50 0.13 0.265 0.238 0.194 0.182 0.187 0.166 0.145 0.100
Developing country importer WTO member 0.67 0.41 0.80 0.044 0.383 0.022 0.083 -0.023 -0.130 -0.096 0.077
0.53 0.39 0.21 0.450 0.235 0.067 0.066 0.063 0.057 0.054 0.051
Importer and exporter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.740 0.739 0.727 0.736 0.743 0.721 0.735 0.741 0.771 0.779 0.787
Number of observations 1502 1989 3166 3995 4738 5688 5968 6316 6715 7674 8080
Root mean square error 1.021 1.044 1.057 1.050 1.055 1.174 1.172 1.125 1.092 1.093 1.107
Table 6. Cross-Section Results
 
Regressand: log real imports. 




Specification FTA GSP Industrial Developing 
WTO member WTO member
Time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects 1.102 0.718 0.964 0.047
0.072 0.096 0.091 0.038
Additional quadratic gravity terms 1.002 0.420 0.552 0.093
(for log real GDP and log real GDP per capita) 0.052 0.055 0.048 0.023
Rose definition of GSP and WTO dummies 0.655 -0.106 0.214 0.051
(i.e., not defined mutually exclusively)  0.046 0.032 0.064 0.026
Weighted least squares (log imports as weight) 0.921 0.440 0.553 0.071
0.050 0.055 0.048 0.023
Weighted least squares (log real GDP as weight) 0.964 0.416 0.541 0.071
0.052 0.057 0.050 0.024
Weighted least squares (log real GDP per capita as weight) 0.933 0.398 0.519 0.060
0.053 0.057 0.050 0.024
Country-pair random effects without importer and exporter fixed effects 0.941 0.349 0.505 0.085
0.036 0.027 0.024 0.015
Country-pair random effects with importer and exporter fixed effects 0.852 0.221 0.355 0.162
0.039 0.038 0.033 0.017
Country-pair fixed effects 0.780 0.169 0.322 0.206
0.042 0.040 0.034 0.018
Excluding values of log imports 3 s.d. away from mean 0.977 0.383 0.513 0.073
0.052 0.056 0.049 0.023
Excluding values of imports  2 s.d. away from mean 1.011 0.345 0.483 0.080
0.054 0.057 0.050 0.023
Table 7.  Robustness Checks: Panel, 1950-2000
 
Regressand: log real imports 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) reported below coefficient estimates.  Intercepts and coefficients for 
standard covariates not reported for ease of presentation. All regressions include time effects and, with the exception of the 
regression with country-pair random effects, also include importer and exporter fixed effects. As noted, the specification in 
the first row includes time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects.  30
Time period for regressions
Free trade area 0.700 0.691 0.692 0.694 0.693 0.699 0.851 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.846
0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.122
Industrial country importer GSP member 0.460 0.450 0.452 0.454 0.454 0.462 0.541 0.543 0.541 0.542 0.537
0.109 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.109 0.109 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153
Industrial country importer WTO member 0.668 0.659 0.660 0.662 0.661 0.667 0.659 0.662 0.661 0.661 0.655
0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.145
Old member (1990) -0.003 -0.116
0.055 0.057
New  member (1990) 0.300 -0.024
0.075 0.082
Old member (1991) 0.015 -0.114
0.054 0.056
New member (1991) 0.297 0.002
0.083 0.095
Old member (1992) 0.025 -0.116
0.054 0.055
New member (1992) 0.299 0.034
0.090 0.105
Old member (1993) 0.028 -0.114
0.053 0.055
New member (1993) 0.296 0.028
0.092 0.108
Old member (1994) 0.045 -0.104
0.053 0.055
New member (1994) 0.253 -0.011
0.101 0.131
Old member (1995) 0.070
0.052
New member (1995) 0.150
0.123
Importer and exporter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations with new members 712 595 531 512 360 217 568 433 388 374 204
F-test for equality of coefficients 2/ 15.85 11.21 9.12 8.30 4.19 0.42 1.28 1.55 2.13 1.77 0.53
Prob > F 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.041 0.517 0.258 0.213 0.145 0.183 0.468
R-square 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779
Number of observations  8080 8080 8080 8080 8080 8080 7674 7674 7674 7674 7674
Root mean square error 1.106 1.107 1.107 1.107 1.107 1.107 1.09334 1.0933 1.09328 1.0933 1.09338
1/  Old and new members refer to developing countries in the WTO; cut-off date for defining these in brackets.
2/  Between old and new member.
1995 2000
Table 8. New and Old Developing Country Members in the WTO 1/
 
Regressand: log real imports 






Table 9. Tariff Bindings and 
Reductions of Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round 1/ 
 
Percent of lines bound pre-Uruguay Round  30.1 
Percent of lines bound post-Uruguay Round  80.8 
Percent of lines unaffected by tariff reductions in Uruguay Round  72.3 
Percentage tariff reduction on lines affected by tariff reductions  8.1 
Post-Uruguay Round applied rate  13.3 
Post-Uruguay Round bound rate  25.2 
Source: Finger, Ingco, and Reincke (1996). 
1/  Includes 21 countries for which data are available in the WTO’s Integrated Data Base (see Table 1 in         
Finger, Ingco, and Reincke, 1996). 
  31
Unprotected Highly protected Clothing Footwear Food
manufacturing manufactures 1/
FTA 0.432 0.494 0.709 0.343 0.176
0.108 0.180 0.150 0.201 0.211
GSP, excluding FTA 0.724 -0.385 0.740 -0.743 0.064
0.150 0.249 0.207 0.277 0.292
Industrial country WTO member 0.618 0.076 0.294 -0.240 -0.866
0.132 0.219 0.182 0.243 0.257
Developing country WTO member 0.096 -0.080 -0.071 -0.295 -0.681
0.080 0.133 0.110 0.147 0.155
Importer and exporter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi-square test for equality of coefficients 2/ 6.70 2.98 13.21 30.37
Prob>chi-square 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.000
Number of observations 4035 4035 4035 4035 4035
R-squared 0.861 0.702 0.793 0.647 0.598
Root mean squared error 1.052 1.751 1.455 1.945 2.050
1/  Excludes clothing and footwear.
2/ Between industrial country dummy in unprotected manufacturing and that in each of the other sectors.
Table 10.  Sectoral Results, Panel, 1990-2000
(Seemingly Unrelated Regressions)
 
Regressand: log real imports. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) reported below coefficient estimates.  
Intercepts and coefficients for all the standard covariates listed in Table 5 are not reported for ease of presentation. 
 
Time period Panel 1950 1955 1960 1965
1950-1965
Industrial country importer WTO member 1.721 0.608 1.334 0.469 1.385
0.200 0.357 0.438 0.127 0.265
Industrial country importer not WTO member 1.261 -0.161 -0.864 0.771 0.370
0.214 0.321 0.266 0.194 0.404
Developing country importer WTO member 0.106 0.673 0.407 1.036 0.044
0.049 0.525 0.389 0.209 0.450
Importer and exporter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
R-square 0.718 0.740 0.739 0.727 0.736
Number of observations 10652 1502 1989 3166 3995
Number of observations where industrial countries
are not WTO members 906 282 180 270 174
Root mean square error 1.057 1.021 1.044 1.057 1.050
F-test 1/ 41.69 9.66 36.13 2.37 7.04
Prob. > F 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.124 0.008
1/  For equality of coefficients between industrial country WTO member and industrial country WTO non-member
Table 11. Industrial Country Effect or WTO Effect?
 
Regressand: log real imports. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs in the case of the panel estimation) reported 
below coefficient estimates.  Intercepts and coefficients for all the standard covariates listed in Table 5 are not reported for 
ease of presentation.  32
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log imports 11.97 2.18 8.52 21.01
Log distance 8.09 0.84 3.78 9.42
Log real GDP importing country 24.37 2.10 17.31 29.41
Log real GDP partner country 24.61 1.96 17.31 29.41
Log real per capita GDP importing country 8.15 1.19 4.33 10.56
Log real per capita GDP partner country 8.19 1.15 4.33 10.71
Common language 0.22 0.42 0 1
Common land border 0.04 0.20 0 1
Common colony 0.07 0.26 0 1
Current colony 0.00 0.05 0 1
Ever colony 0.03 0.18 0 1
Common country 0.00 0.02 0 1
Common currency 0.01 0.12 0 1
Free trade area 0.03 0.17 0 1
GSP (excl. FTAs) 0.14 0.35 0 1
Developing country WTO member (excl. FTAs and GSP) 0.19 0.39 0 1
Industrial country WTO member (excl. FTAs and GSP) 0.27 0.45 0 1
55831 observations, spanning every five years between 1950 and 2000
Sources: Rose (2002a) and IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (see Appendix).
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
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Industrial Countries:
AUSTRALIA (1948) GREECE (1950) NORWAY (1948)
AUSTRIA (1951) ICELAND (1968) PORTUGAL (1962)
BELGIUM (1948) IRELAND (1967) SPAIN (1963)
CANADA (1948) ITALY (1950) SWEDEN (1950)
DENMARK (1950) JAPAN (1955) SWITZERLAND (1966)
FINLAND (1950) LUXEMBOURG (1948) UNITED KINGDOM (1948)
FRANCE (1948) NETHERLANDS (1948) UNITED STATES (1948)
GERMANY (1951) NEW ZEALAND (1948)
Developing Countries and Territories
ALBANIA (2000) GHANA (1957) PANAMA (1997)
ALGERIA GRENADA (1994) PAPUA N.GUINEA (1994)
ANGOLA (1994) GUATEMALA (1991) PARAGUAY (1994)
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA (1987) GUINEA (1994) PERU (1951)
ARGENTINA (1967) GUINEA-BISSAU (1994) PHILIPPINES (1979)
ARMENIA GUYANA (1966) POLAND (1967)
AZERBAIJAN HAITI (1950) QATAR (1994)
BAHAMAS HONDURAS (1994) REUNION (1948)
BAHRAIN (1993) HONG KONG SAR (1986) ROMANIA (1971)
BANGLADESH (1972) HUNGARY (1973) RUSSIA
BARBADOS (1967) INDIA (1948) RWANDA (1966)
BELARUS INDONESIA (1950) SAMOA
BELIZE (1983) IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
BENIN (1996) IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA
BERMUDA (1948) ISRAEL (1962) SENEGAL (1963)
BHUTAN JAMAICA (1963) SEYCHELLES
BOLIVIA (1990) JORDAN (2000) SIERRA LEONE (1961)
BOTSWANA (1987) KAZAKHSTAN SINGAPORE (1973)
BRAZIL (1948) KENYA (1964) SLOVAK REPUBLIC (1993)
BULGARIA (1996) KIRIBATI SLOVENIA (1994)
BURKINA FASO (1963) KOREA(R) (1967) SOLOMON ISLANDS (1994)
BURUNDI (1965) KUWAIT (1963) SOMALIA
CAMBODIA KYRQYZ REPUBLIC (1998) SOUTH AFRICA (1948)
CAMEROON (1963) LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP. SRI LANKA (1948)
CAPE VERDE LATVIA (1999) ST. KITTS&NEVIS (1994)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. (1963) LESOTHO (1988) ST.LUCIA (1993)
CHAD (1963) LIBERIA ST.VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES (1993)
CHILE (1949) LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA SUDAN
CHINA (2001) LITHUANIA (2001) SURINAME (1978)
COLOMBIA (1981)
MACEDONIA, former YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC OF SWAZILAND (1993)
COMOROS (1948) MADAGASCAR (1963) SYRIA
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF (ZAIRE) (1971) MALAWI (1964) TAJIKISTAN
CONGO, REP. OF (1963) MALAYSIA (1957) TANZANIA (1961)
COSTA RICA (1990) MALDIVES (1983) THAILAND (1982)
COTE D'IVORIE (IVORY COAST) (1963) MALI (1993) TOGO (1964)
CROATIA (2000) MALTA (1964) TONGA
CYPRUS (1963) MAURITANIA (1963) TRINIDAD&TOBAGO (1962)
CZECH REPUBLIC (1993) MAURITIUS (1970) TUNISIA (1990)
DJIBOUTI (1994) MYANMAR (1948) TURKEY (1951)
DOMINICA (1993) MEXICO (1986) TURKMENISTAN
DOMINICAN REP. (1950) MOLDOVA (2001) UGANDA (1962)
ECUADOR (1996) MONGOLIA (1997) UKRAINE
EGYPT (1970) MOROCCO (1987) UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (1994)
EL SALVADOR (1991) MOZAMBIQUE (1992) URUGUAY (1953)
EQUATORIAL GUINEA NAMIBIA (1992) UZBEKISTAN
ESTONIA (1999) NEPAL VANUATU
ETHIOPIA NICARAGUA (1950) VENEZUELA (1990)
FIJI (1993) NIGER (1963) VIETNAM
GABON (1963) NIGERIA (1960) YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF
GAMBIA, THE (1965) OMAN (2000) YUGOSLAVIA, SOCIALIST FED. REP. OF (1966)
GEORGIA (2000) PAKISTAN (1948) ZAMBIA (1982)
ZIMBABWE (1948)
Sources: Rose (2002a) and WTO website on accession (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm).
Appendix  Table 2.  List of Countries in the Sample
(Dates of GATT/WTO accession in parenthesis) 34
 
1990  1991 1992 1993 1994  1995
Bolivia  El Salvador 
Costa Rica  Guatemala  Mozambique Bahrain Angola  Brunei
Tunisia  Mozambique  Namibia Czech Republic Djibouti  Benin
Venezuela  Namibia  Bahrain Dominica Grenada  Bulgaria
El Salvador  Bahrain  Czech Republic Fiji Guinea  Ecuador
Guatemala  Czech Republic  Dominica Mali Guinea-Bissau  Mongolia
Mozambique  Dominica  Fiji Slovak Republic Honduras  Panama
Namibia  Fiji Mali St. Lucia Papua New Guinea  Kyrgyz Republic
Bahrain  Mali  Slovak Republic St. Vincent and Grenadines Paraguay  Estonia
Czech Republic  Slovak Republic  St. Lucia Swaziland Qatar Latvia
Dominica  St. Lucia  St. Vincent and Grenadines Angola Slovenia  Albania
Fiji  St. Vincent and Grenadines  Swaziland Djibouti Solomon Islands  Croatia
Mali  Swaziland  Angola Grenada St. Kitts and Nevis  Georgia
Slovak Republic  Angola  Djibouti Guinea United Arab Emirates  Jordan
St. Lucia  Djibouti  Grenada Guinea-Bissau Oman
St. Vincent and Grenadines  Grenada  Guinea Honduras
Swaziland  Guinea  Guinea-Bissau Papua New Guinea
Angola  Guinea-Bissau  Honduras Paraguay
Djibouti  Honduras  Papua New Guinea Qatar
Grenada  Papua New Guinea  Paraguay Slovenia
Guinea  Paraguay  Qatar Solomon Islands
Guinea-Bissau  Qatar  Slovenia St. Kitts and Nevis
Honduras  Slovenia  Solomon Islands United Arab Emirates
Papua New Guinea  Solomon Islands  St. Kitts and Nevis Brunei
Paraguay  St. Kitts and Nevis  United Arab Emirates Benin
Qatar  United Arab Emirates  Brunei Bulgaria
Slovenia  Brunei  Benin Ecuador
Solomon Islands  Benin  Bulgaria Mongolia
St. Kitts and Nevis  Bulgaria  Ecuador Panama
United Arab Emirates  Ecuador  Mongolia Kyrgyz Republic
Brunei  Mongolia  Panama Estonia
Benin  Panama  Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Bulgaria  Kyrgyz Republic  Estonia Albania
Ecuador  Estonia  Latvia Croatia
Mongolia  Latvia  Albania Georgia
Panama  Albania  Croatia Jordan
Kyrgyz Republic  Croatia  Georgia Oman
Estonia  Georgia  Jordan
Latvia  Jordan  Oman





Source: WTO's website on accession (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm) and based on definitions described in text.
Appendix Table 3.  List of "New" Members
(Defined according to various cut-off dates listed below) 35
Albania Iceland Sri Lanka
Algeria India St. Kitts and Nevis
Argentina Indonesia St. Lucia




Bahamas, The Jamaica Switzerland





Belize Korea Trinidad and Tobago
Benin Kuwait Tunisia




Burkina Faso Macedonia, FYR United Arab Emirates
Burundi Madagascar United Kingdom
Cameroon Malawi United States
Canada Malaysia Uruguay
Central African Rep. Maldives Vanuatu
Chad Mali Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Chile Malta Vietnam
China,People's Republic of Mauritius Yemen, Republic of
Colombia Mexico Zambia
Comoros Moldova Zimbabwe




























Hong Kong, SAR South Africa
Hungary Spain
Sources: United Ntaions' TRAINS and COMTRADE databases.
Appendix Table 4.  List of Countries in the Disaggregate Estimations
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HS 1988/1992  DESCRIPTION  HS 1988/1992 DESCRIPTION 
FOOD  UNPROTECTED MANUFACTURING 
0704  Cabbages, cauliflowers, kohlrabi, kale...etc.  3704 Photographic plates, film, paper 
0710  Vegetables, frozen  3706 Cinematographic film, exposed and developed 
1517  Margarine; edible preparations of animal or veg 4901 Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar 
1901  Malt extract; food preparations of flour, etc .  4902 Newspapers, journals and periodicals 
2002  Tomatoes prepared or preserved   4904 Music, printed or in manuscript 
2403  Other manufactured tobacco and substitutes  4905 Maps, etc (incl. atlases, wall maps...), printed 
4907 New stamps; stamp-impressed paper; banknotes 
CLOTHING  4911 Other printed matter, including printed picture 
5111  Woven fabrics of carded wool or of carded fine 8408 Compression-ignition,combustion piston engines 
5112  Woven fabrics of combed wool or of combed fine 8409 Accessory parts suitable for engines of heading 
6101  Men's or boys' overcoats... and similar article  8411 Turbo-jets,turbo-propellers and other gas turbines 
6102  Woman's or girls' overcoats and similar article  8413 Pumps for liquids,with or without measuring devices 
6103  Men's or boys' suits, ensembles, etc, knitted  8414 Air or vacuum pumps,exhausting and compression 
6104  Women's or girls' suits, ensembles, etc, knitted  8419 Machinery,plant or lab equipment for all purposes 
6105  Men's or boys' shirts, knitted or crocheted  8424 Mechanical appliances for projecting 
6106  Women's or girls' blouses, etc, knitted or crocheted 8471 Automatic data processing,magnetic,optical  
6109  T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted or crotcheted 8483 Transmission shafts,cranks,clutches,shafts 
6110  Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans and similar articles 8501 Electric motors and generators 
6111  Babies' garments and clothing accessories, knitted 8516 Electric instantaneous,domestic appliances 
6112  Track-suits, ski-suits and swimwear, knitted or crotcheted 8524 Records,tapes for sound etc.
6114  Other garments, knitted or crocheted, nes  8539 Electtic filament,discharge lamps,ulta-violet 
6115  Panty hose, tights, etc, and footwear, knitted  8802 Other aircraft,spacecraft,and spacecrats launch 
6203  Men's or boys' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers 8803 Parts of goods of heading No. 88.01,88.02 
6204  Women's or girls' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers 8805 Aircraft launching gear,deck-arrestor etc. 
6206  Women's or girls' blouses, shirts and shirt-blouses 8901 Cruise ships,excursion/ferry-boatsetc. 
6209  Bables' garments and clothing accessories  8902 Fishing vessels;factory ships 
6211  Track suits, ski suits and swimwear  8903 Yachts,other vessels for pleasure/sports,rowing 
6303  Curtains (incl. drapes) and interior blinds  8904 Tugs and pusher craft
6308  Sets of woven fabric and yarn  8905 Navigation vessels,floating or submersible drills 
8906 Other vessels including warships,lifeboats  
FOOTWEAR  8908 Vessels and other floating structures  
6401  Waterproof footwear 9014 Direction finding conpasses;other navigational devices 
6402  Other footwear with outer soles and uppers of rubber 9020 Other breathing appliances,gas masks 
6404  Footwear with rubber, plastic, leather soles   9029 Revolution counters,mileomoters,pedometers etc. 
9305 Parts,accessories of articles of heading 93.01 
HIGHLY PROTECTED MANUFACTURING 9506 Articles,equipments for general physical exercise 
6911  Tableware,kitchenware,other household,toilet articles 9601 Worked ivory,bone,tortoise-shell,coral 
7013  Glass articles used for indoor decoration   9701 Hand made decorative materials 
8704  Motor vehicles for the transport of goods  9702 Original engravings,prints,lithographs 
9703 Original sculptures and statuary,in any material 
9704 Postage,revenue stamps,pastal stationery etc. 
Source: United Nations' TRAINS database. 
Appendix Table 5. List of sectors by classification
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Appendix Table 6.  List of Free Trade Areas/Customs Unions 
 
Data on free trade areas and customs union (FTAs) for the years 1950–1995 comes from Rose (2002a). For 
2000, we use the WTO’s website on regional agreements 
(www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm) by selecting all agreements notified to the WTO whose 







Turkey —  Slovenia EC — Tunisia
EC — Slovenia Estonia — Turkey 
EC — Lithuania Slovenia — Israel
EC — Estonia Poland — Israel
EC — Latvia Estonia — Faroe Islands
Chile — Mexico Czech Republic — Estonia
Chile — Mexico Slovak Republic — Estonia
Mexico — Israel Lithuania — Turkey 
Georgia —  Armenia  Israel — Turkey
Georgia —  Azerbaijan  Romania — Turkey 
Georgia —  Kazakhstan  Hungary — Turkey 
Georgia —  Turkmenistan  Czech Republic — Israel
Georgia —  Ukraine  Slovak Republic — Israel
Latvia — Turkey  Slovenia — Croatia
Turkey — Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Hungary — Israel
EC — South Africa CEFTA accession of Romania
EC — Morocco CEFTA accession of Slovenia
EC — Israel Poland — Lithuania
EC — Mexico Slovak Republic — Latvia
Estonia — Ukraine Slovak Republic — Lithuania
Poland — Turkey  Canada — Chile
EFTA — Morocco Czech Republic — Latvia
Bulgaria — Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Czech Republic — Lithuania
Hungary — Latvia Canada — Chile
Hungary — Lithuania Slovenia — Estonia
Poland — Latvia Slovenia — Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Poland — Faroe Islands Slovenia — Latvia
Kyrgyz Republic — Moldova Slovenia — Lithuania 
Kyrgyz Republic — Ukraine EC — Faroe Islands
Kyrgyz Republic — Uzbekistan Canada — Israel
Bulgaria — Turkey EC — Slovenia
Czech Republic — Turkey  EFTA — Estonia
EAEC EFTA — Latvia
CEFTA accession of Bulgaria EFTA — Lithuania
Slovak Republic — Turkey  EC — Turkey




  of which industrial country importers 823
GSP (excluding FTA) 7,895
Industrial country importing members of WTO (excl. GSP andd FTA) 10,452
Developing country importing members of WTO (excl. GSP and FTA) 15,271
Other (=developing countries not members of the WTO) 19,825
Total 55,831
Memorandum items
GSP including FTAs 8,053
Industrial country WTO importers 17,825
  of which:  in FTAs 823
                   in GSP 8,053
                    in FTAs and GSP 158
Developing country WTO importers 21,176
  of which:  in FTAs 518
1/ That is, for sample comprising trade values greater than $500,000.
Appendix Table 7.  Composition of Sample in Core Specification 1/
(Corresponding to columns 3-6 in Table 5)
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Log distance -1.111 -1.308 -1.108 -1.305
0.023 0.024 0.023 0.024
Log product real gdp 0.928 0.183 0.926 0.164
0.010 0.055 0.010 0.056
Log product real per capita GDP 0.268 0.378 0.269 0.401
0.014 0.052 0.014 0.052
Common language 0.365 0.296 0.360 0.295
0.041 0.046 0.041 0.046
Common border 0.504 0.256 0.501 0.253
0.111 0.111 0.110 0.111
Landlocked -0.333 -0.451 -0.333 -0.407
0.032 0.308 0.032 0.309
Island 0.059 0.577 0.059 0.444
0.037 0.214 0.037 0.214
Log product area -0.097 0.504 -0.095 0.514
0.008 0.040 0.008 0.040
Common colony 0.524 0.531 0.515 0.520
0.069 0.068 0.069 0.068
Current colony 0.920 0.645 0.874 0.556
0.216 0.253 0.215 0.251
Ever colony 1.168 1.268 1.179 1.280
0.117 0.115 0.117 0.116
Common country 0.224 0.374 0.236 0.444
0.971 0.605 0.965 0.601
Common currency 1.226 1.324 1.212 1.307
0.125 0.130 0.125 0.130
Free trade area 0.858 0.739 1.031 1.078
0.092 0.102 0.109 0.115
GSP 1/ 0.800 0.605
0.032 0.033
One country in WTO 1/ 0.012 0.076
0.052 0.047
Both countries in WTO 1/ 0.026 0.131
0.056 0.054
GSP 2/ 0.838 0.840
0.063 0.062
One country in WTO 2/ -0.025 0.100
0.053 0.049
Both countries in WTO 2/ 0.076 0.303
0.058 0.054
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.653 0.708 0.653 0.708
Number of observations 51400 51400 51400 51400
Root mean square error 1.961 1.802 1.960 1.801
1/  As defined in Rose (2002a)
2/  Defined mutually exclusively. That is, GSP excludes common FTA country pairs, 
and WTO dummies exclude common FTA and GSP country-pairs
Appendix Table 8. Sensitivity of Core Specification of Rose (2002a)
 
Regressand log real trade.  Robust standard errors (clustered by country pairs) reported below coefficient 
estimates. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to the specification in columns 1 and 4 in Table 1 of Rose (2002a). 